Talk:Electoral system

Request: Rewrite categories to follow more standard, four-family classification

Standard, four-family classification of voting systems is:

1. Positional voting: f(k) points for each ballot ranking a candidate in k-th place. Candidate with most points is the winner. Includes Plurality, Borda, Dowdall.
2. Sequential methods: Sequentially eliminate biggest losers according to some other method. Rerun election excluding them. Includes Nanson, instant-runoff voting (sequential-loser plurality), descending solid coalitions.
3. Round-Robin methods: Compare every candidate in a round-robin tournament. Winner is the candidate who is "closest to winning every match" (different methods define "closest" differently). Includes Ranked pairs, Schulze's method, Minimax Condorcet
4. Cardinal methods: Every candidate gets a rating or grade; candidate with highest grade wins. Includes score (highest average), approval, highest median.
5. (Optional) Hybrids: Combine 2 of the above. Includes STAR voting, Smith//Score (can be grouped with Cardinal), Tideman alternative (grouped with sequential?)

Notably, "majoritarian" is an incorrect name, as it applies only to Condorcet methods. Plurality+IRV do not require a majority of the vote.

Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 17:54, 11 March 2024 (UTC)

This isn't the right place to discuss categories. If you want to rename a category, use WP:CfD. Cheers, Number 57 19:44, 11 March 2024 (UTC)

Sorry if I was unclear; I meant the article should be rewritten to explain the common classification of voting systems, which groups them into these 4 families (which I called categories). Each family should have its own section. This is not related to Wikipedia categories. Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 21:15, 11 March 2024 (UTC)

I don't think that would work as the list above omits multiple types of elections (where does PR fit into it?). Based on your comments elsewhere, I think you are overcomplicating matters unnecessarily. Number 57 21:43, 11 March 2024 (UTC)

This categorization is only related to single-member elections (PR is a separate class of systems). This is to replace the current "Plurality" and "Majority" categorization shown here.

My main issue with the current taxonomy is "majoritarian" or "majority" are used in voting system literature to refer to Condorcet methods, not to IRV (a variant of plurality). Sometimes "majoritarian" is used to mean single-member (though that's a bit of a misnomer), in which case plurality would count as well. Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 22:06, 11 March 2024 (UTC)

Do you have any source for this being standard? I have not really seen it like this before. Jannikp97 (talk) 07:29, 12 March 2024 (UTC)

I'll try and find a better (textbook) reference when I'm not on mobile, but here's an example of social choice theorists using it. They use the terms "graded" (for cardinal), "iterative" (for sequential), and "margin" (for round-robin), but the classes are the same. —Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 16:53, 12 March 2024 (UTC)

I found another example of it being used here. Like I said elsewhere, this categorization isn't unique/universal, but it's used in several texts. ("Standard" was the wrong word—"common" would've been better.) –Maximum Limelihood Estimator 02:42, 25 April 2024 (UTC)

Maybe we should group together the "Core support" systems (FPP, DAC/DSC, IRV) instead? Then the other categories would be majority-rule (Condorcet) and rated voting. –Maximum Limelihood Estimator 21:25, 26 April 2024 (UTC)

I'm not really seeing the need to deviate from the existing classification, although I think we could perhaps make the first four listed (plurality, majority, proportional and mixed) separate from the subsequent ones (primary, indirect, others). Number 57 22:02, 27 April 2024 (UTC)

I'm in the process of writing some articles that will explain the research on this by social choice theorists. The upshot is that under strategic voting patterns, FPP turns into a "de facto" instant-runoff system: in the early stages of a campaign, strategic voters abandon the weakest candidates and consolidate around two major candidates, leading to a "runoff" dynamic where only these two candidates get a meaningful share of the vote. In the United States, you can think of the "consolidation" process as being the primaries for each party, and then the runoff is the general election (where only the major-party nominees have a real chance, so other candidates can be safely ignored).

As a result, IRV and FPP tend to behave very similarly to each other, but very differently from other systems (like score or Condorcet voting). IRV and FPP tend to lead to polarized two-party systems, whereas score (under strategic behavior) or Condorcet methods select winners who are close to the median voter's ideology. –Maximum Limelihood Estimator 15:17, 28 April 2024 (UTC)

Oh, to clarify—single-winner and multi-winner (including proportional) systems should definitely be kept in separate articles. Worth noting that any single-winner system can be made proportional by using the Single Transferable Vote technique, though. –Maximum Limelihood Estimator 04:06, 29 April 2024 (UTC)

@Number 57 I think maybe this will help clear things up. There are two distinct branches of science that study electoral systems:

1. The positive study of electoral systems as actually existing sets of laws in different countries. This kind of cataloging would fall under law or political science.
2. The normative study of electoral systems as abstract objects or rules for mapping individual preferences to social preferences (called social choice functions). This is a branch of economics and mathematics called social choice theory, which includes results like Arrow's theorem or everything at comparison of electoral systems.

So far, Wiki articles have been written mostly from the first perspective; this can be a bit of a problem because these fields have different terminologies and focuses. As an example, single-member plurality or IRV would never be called "majoritarian" in social choice theory. The term "majoritarian" is reserved exclusively for the Condorcet methods (which guarantee a majority of voters always gets their way). However, political scientists will sometimes call any winner-take-all system "majoritarian", because these tend to produce legislatures where one party has a majority. –Maximum Limelihood Estimator 21:19, 5 May 2024 (UTC)

Found another example of it being used—

https://www.accuratedemocracy.com/archive/condorcet/Monroe/004004MonroeBurt.pdf –Sincerely, A Lime 01:50, 15 May 2024 (UTC)

Suggestion: Split portions off into multiwinner and single-winner systems

We can leave a smaller article behind here. I think splitting this into two separate articles should help us give each family of methods the focus it deserves. –Sincerely, A Lime 19:28, 17 May 2024 (UTC)

I don't think this is a good idea. There should be a single overarching article on electoral systems IMO. Number 57 01:28, 18 May 2024 (UTC)

I think it's perfectly fine to include something here! I've got no objections to keeping something here—there should definitely be some kind of article here.

My suggestion is more that we try slimming this down and putting the details in new articles on single-winner and multi-winner systems. –Sincerely, A Lime 02:34, 18 May 2024 (UTC)

STV

Ireland and Northern Ireland both use STV, yet have different scores on gallagher index, 2.22 for Ireland and 7.8 for Northern Ireland, so how they can be protional

Ireland 2020 GE, 160

Fianna Fail Vote share 22.2% Seat share 23.75 Seat won 38 160×22.2%=35 seats

Sinn Fein vote share 24.5% Seat share 23.125% Seat won 37 160×24.5=39 seats

Fine Gael Vote share 20.9% Seat share 21.875% Seats won 35 160×20.9%=33 seats

Northern ireland 2022 Assembly elections

Sinn Fein Vote share 29% Seat share 30% Seats won 27 90×29%=26 seat

DUP Vote share 21.3% Seat share 27.7% Seat won 25 90×21.3%=19 seats

Alliance Alliance Vote share 13.5 Seat share 18.8% Seat won 17 90×13.5=12 seats

jamestwice Jamestwice (talk) 10:35, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

Move discussion for "Condorcet paradox"

Your participation could help Wikipedia decide on the best title for the page:

• Talk:Condorcet_paradox#Requested_move_13_August_2024

Jruderman (talk) 03:48, 22 August 2024 (UTC)

Request: More information on importance

Lots of people I talk to are basically convinced that electoral systems don't matter, mostly because of the big wave of recent studies showing ranked-choice voting has no effect on most outcomes of interest when compared to first-past-the-post. I'm pretty sure that's not the case when you look outside of the plurality-with-elimination family, and particularly when you look at proportional representation. This seems like a very important thing to talk about—I'd love to have more information on studies relating to the importance of electoral systems to outcomes like democratic backsliding, voter satisfaction, and overall stability. – Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 17:25, 3 September 2024 (UTC)

In the United States, ranked choice ballots have not yet been used to elect state legislators, or a meaningful number of members of Congress. When that happens laws and taxes are likely to be reformed. Then the economic advantages (reduced corruption, fewer unfair monopolies, fewer unfair tax subsidies, fewer unfair tax breaks, etc.) will become evident. In the meantime it's nearly impossible to research and yield evidence of these advantages. Remember the role of governors and presidents is to enforce the laws and taxes passed in legislatures. VoteFair (talk) 18:18, 3 September 2024 (UTC)

I'm not talking about effects on government policy. I doubt any study could show effects on that because reality is underpowered. I'm just referring to papers showing no difference on the results of elections—null effects on electoral competition, number of parties, or descriptive representation of groups like minorities and women. And in ~96% of cases where voting goes into multiple rounds, IRV and FPP line up. So, if it has no effect on the candidates who run, and no effect on which candidate wins, that's some pretty airtight evidence that there's no effect at all. – Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 19:17, 3 September 2024 (UTC)

(Note that I'm referring to the American political context, where my read on the literature is that IRV is basically reinventing the existing primary system, which already prevents spoilers from substantially affecting the results of an election.) – Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 18:12, 4 September 2024 (UTC)